








vs. Dividends in 













Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the 
MSc in Finance at CLSBE, at Universidade Católica Portuguesa and for 
the MSc in Management at ESCP, at ESCP Europe Paris, June 2019. 
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The literature shows an increase in activity in share repurchases in the latest years in Europe 
and in the U.S., alongside a reappearance of dividends. This research reveals a surge in 
repurchases of 107% in Europe and of 55% in the U.S. for the 2001-18 period, whereas the 
fraction of dividends slightly increased 7 p.p. in Europe, to 91%, and 6 p.p. in the U.S., to 79%, 
in 2018. Although these are two forms of disbursing cash to shareholders, dividends tend to be 
more resilient and carry signaling power, whilst repurchases are more sporadic and their policy 
can vary without compromise. The focus is on ascertaining the significant drivers for 
repurchases and dividend payments. Hence, the main characteristics analysed are the Size, Cash 
Holdings, Investment Opportunities, Leverage Ratio, Profitability and Region. The majority 
proved to be significant across the models measuring the propensity to pay dividends and 
repurchase shares, and the natural logarithm of the amount of dividends and repurchases, mostly 
confirming the expected relationships.  
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Desmistificando a Recompra de Ações vs. Dividendos 
na Europa e nos EUA 





A literatura demostra um aumento na atividade de recompra de ações nos últimos anos na 
Europa e Estados Unidos, ao mesmo tempo que um reaparecimento de dividendos. Esta 
pesquisa revela um aumento da recompra de ações de 107% na Europa e 55% nos Estados 
Unidos entre 2001 e 2018, enquanto que os dividendos subiram ligeiramente, cerca de 7 p.p na 
Europa, atingindo 91%, e 6 p.p nos Estados Unidos, alcançando 79%, em 2018. Apesar estas 
serem duas formas de distribuir resultados aos acionistas, os dividendos tendem a ser mais 
resilientes e têm um maior poder de sinalização, enquanto que as recompras são mais 
esporádicas e a sua política pode variar sem compromisso. O objetivo é determinar indicadores 
que expliquem o comportamento da recompra de ações e pagamento de dividendos. Assim, as 
principais características analisadas são a Dimensão, Tesouraria, Oportunidades de 
Investimento, Rácio de dívida, Rentabilidade e Região. A maioria é significante em vários 
modelos medindo a propensão para pagar dividendos e recomprar ações, e o logaritmo do valor 
desses dividendos e recompras, a maioria confirmando a ligação esperada.  
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“Do you know the only thing that gives me pleasure? It's to see my dividends coming in.” - 
John D. Rockefeller 
“When stock can be bought below a business’s value it is probably the best use of cash” – 
Warren Buffett 
Firms can distribute cash to shareholders by paying dividends or by buying back shares. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1961) (hereafter: MM), rational investors do not have any 
predilection for any of these two forms of payout in efficient capital markets. Nevertheless, 
Vermaelen (1981) shows that, in inefficient capital markets, companies’ payout decisions 
reveal information on its future cash flows. 
For the last decades, firms have been changing their behavior towards payout policies. In the 
U.S., dividends were disappearing in the early 2000s given a shift in the characteristics of a 
firm and a lower propensity to pay by the companies with the specific characteristics of a 
dividend payer (see Fama and French (2001), hereafter: FF, and DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(2006)). On the other hand, Von Eije and Megginson (2008) found an escalating wave of 
popularity of Share Buybacks in Europe in the late 1990s, although U.S. firms experienced it 
earlier, and a decrease in the fraction of European and American firms paying dividends. In 
addition, although Manconi et al. (2013) reports a general increase of repurchases around the 
world, Skinner (2008) shows repurchases are becoming significantly more important in the U.S. 
while compared to dividends, which has not been verified in Europe yet.  
The target of study of this dissertation is the largest firms in Europe and in the U.S. It covers 
the firms of the two respective indexes, the S&P 350 Europe Index (417 firms) and the S&P 
500 Index (467 firms), over the 2001-18 period. The period of analysis coincides with the 
reappearance of dividends and increase of popularity of buybacks, chosen strategically so that 
the impact of the crisis and new regulations could be taken into account. The firms split into 
categories according to their payout policy, whether: no payout policy, dividends only, 
repurchases only, or both. The five main characteristics analysed are Size, Cash Holdings, 
Investment Opportunities, Leverage Ratio and Profitability. The research moves towards an 
empirical analysis on the propensity to pay dividends, to repurchase, and on the natural 
logarithm of the amount of dividends and repurchases. 
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To start, contrarily to the tendency found in FF, firms paying dividends in the U.S. increase 
from 73% in 2001 to 79% in 2018, while in Europe the jump is from 84% to 91%. Following 
this trend, repurchases boost 107% in Europe and 55% in the U.S. over the same timeframe. 
The new regulation introducing “safe harbor” provisions in 1982 in the U.S. and in 2003 in 
Europe are key milestones that drove this peak of repurchases. Moreover, the Bush Tax Cut in 
the U.S. in 2003 also pushes in favor of dividends. Then, during the crisis, the resilience of 
dividends is verified. Hence, in 2009, while the decrease in the number of dividend payers was 
small in Europe (7%) and in the U.S. (4%), the crisis affected repurchases more intensively, 
registering acute falls in Europe (39%) and in the U.S. (26%). In line with the literature, 
buybacks (59%) are the dominant form of payout in the U.S., whereas in Europe the higher 
fraction goes for dividend payers (76%). 
Assuming a relation between both forms of distributing cash to shareholders, the fraction of 
firms that do both in the U.S. (71%) is higher than in Europe (55%). Dividend payers represent 
only 36% in Europe versus 28% in the U.S., while firms only repurchasing speak for 18% in 
the U.S. against the modest 3% in Europe.  
Then, as suggested by FF, the research goes towards the characteristics of firms according to 
each category. Starting with Size, this paper confirms FF and Andriosopoulos and Hoque 
(2011) findings, in which firms in both regions that pay dividends and repurchase shares are 
larger firms than those which do not. Moving on, a firm holding high amounts of cash is less 
prone to be a dividend-payer and more to repurchase shares (Von Eije and Megginson (2008)). 
Moreover, Investment Opportunities leads to more repurchases (Barth and Kasznik (1999)), 
and less dividend payments (DeAngelo et al. (2004)). This paper shows that dividend-paying 
firms in the U.S. are more leveraged than those in Europe, while firms that repurchase have 
lower debt ratios, similar for both regions. The fifth characteristic is consensual among 
literature and both indexes, as companies that pay dividends and engage in share repurchasing 
are the most profitable ones. 
Lastly, in the first model, European firms confirm a positive relationship between Size, 
Investment Opportunities and Profitability and a negative one for Cash Holdings and Leverage 
Ratio with the propensity to pay dividends. Whereas in the U.S., firms show a negative relation 
for Investment Opportunities and a positive one for Leverage Ratio. The joint model shows a 
statistical significance for the index, confirming that an American firm has, on average, lower 
propensity to pay dividends. Regarding the propensity to repurchase shares, firms in Europe 
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and in the U.S. show a positive relation with Size, Investment Opportunities and Profitability 
and a negative with Cash Holdings and Leverage Ratio (same as in dividends). However, this 
time there is a statistically significant difference in favor of U.S. firms, which reveal higher 
likelihood to repurchase than European firms do. Considering the amount disbursed, there is 
evidence of a positive influence of all variables with the dividends paid in the U.S., while in 
Europe Cash Holdings and Leverage Ratio maintain its negative relation with the amount paid 
in dividends. Moreover, an American firm pays significantly less dividends than a European 
one. The findings show that only Leverage keeps a negative relationship with the amount 
repurchased. Finally, a firm in the U.S. significantly repurchases more shares than one in 
Europe.  
This paper contributes to several areas of the corporate finance literature. Firstly, it contributes 
with current and updated results on the similarities and differences of the trends of the various 
payout policies embraced by the largest European and American firms in terms of market 
capitalization. Secondly, it describes the behavior of these firms according to the five main 
characteristics identified before, throughout the timeframe, obtaining expected and curious 
outcomes with small nuances regarding their country of origin. Thirdly, it produces significant 
findings on the main drivers and the influence of being a European or American firm with 
respect to the propensity to either pay dividends or repurchase shares as well as to the respective 
amount disbursed.  
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents and describes 
the data used in the analysis. Section 3 explores the time trends of Dividends, Share 
Repurchases and firms pursuing each payout policy method. Section 4 presents the findings on 
the regression analysis for each model. Section 5 provides a conclusion of the study. Section 6 
displays the references and Section 7 the appendices.  
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2. Literature Review 
MM came up with the assumption that in efficient capital markets, at the most fundamental 
level, rational investors do not have any preference regarding capital gains and dividends, 
meaning, they are perfect substitutes. As such, dividend policies should not be relevant; one 
can use either dividends or repurchases to pay investors the residual cash. However, the 
following assumptions must verify: a) no taxes; b) symmetric information among all market 
participants; c) complete contracting possibilities; d) no transaction or issuance costs; e) 
competitive product and financial markets; f) rational investors and managers. Hence, whenever 
markets are inefficient, by changing the payout policy the company is disclosing information 
about their future cash flows (supported by Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and 
Vermaelen (1981)). 
However, MM’s results were challenged by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) as they assumed 
a full distribution policy disbursing 100% of free cash flow, not having the possibility to retain 
profits. Henceforth, payout policy matters in the same logic that investment policy matters, 
even in smooth markets.  
Accordingly, it gives place to the question on whether dividends and repurchases are 
substitutes. John and Williams (1985), Bernheim (1991) and Allen et al. (2000) affirm that they 
are not “interchangeable”. Moreover, MM, Easterbrook (1984), Miller and Rock (1985) and 
Grullon and Michaely (2002), by saying they are close substitutes, are opposing to DeAngelo 
et al. (2000) as no evidence that share repurchase programs have replaced special dividends 
was found, thus no proof for a substitution effect. However, Allen et al. (2000) came to 
strengthen it by claiming that dividends attract institutions. As they are more prone to detect 
any misevaluation on a company, only the undervalued companies are willing to be monitored, 
thus paying higher dividends. 
Taxation plays an essential role on payout policy. The most intuitive assumption is that it would 
be theoretically disadvantageous for a firm to pay dividends as it is highly taxed and share 
repurchases are both tax-favored and more flexible. Notwithstanding, many firms still pay 
dividends as, for instance, it provides certainty about a company’s financial well-being and a 
variation in its distribution affects the stock price. Further, Baker and Wurgler (2004) shows 
prevailing investor demand mainly induces the payment of dividends. Even though Barclay and 
Smith (1988) assert that repurchases might be preferred over dividends, as taxation on capital 
gains is lower than on dividend income, Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2011) does not find any 
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evidence that this tax advantage considerably influences managers’ decision to make a buyback 
announcement. Likewise, differences in the taxation of dividends and capital gains only bear a 
second order impact on setting payout policy (Farre-Mensa et al. (2014)). 
Throughout the early 2000s the fraction of dividend-paying firms decreased. According to FF 
and DeAngelo et al. (2006), it was due to a shift in firm characteristics and to a lower propensity 
to pay dividends by those firms with the typical characteristics of a dividend payer. In the U.S., 
the portion of public firms that pay dividends plunged from 66.5% in 1978 (and over 80% 
during the 1950s) to 20.8% in 1999. The proportion of European companies paying dividends 
constantly declines over the 1989-2005 period, whilst total amount of dividends paid surges 
alongside share repurchases (Von Eije and Megginson (2008)). 
However, in the U.S. in late 2004, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) showed that dividends might be 
“reappearing”. There is a 5 p.p. rise in the share of U.S. industrial firms that pay dividends. In 
the paper, the author finds the 2003 Bush Tax Cut one of the most plausible explanations for 
this turnaround. Following this Tax Cut, Chetty and Saez (2005) and Poterba (2004) estimated 
a 20% increase in dividend payments in a single-country and single-event study. In theory, such 
dividend tax cut is supposed to increase investment, profit and dividend distributions in the long 
term. Brown et al. (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2010) reinforce that companies with high insider 
ownership are most likely to respond to tax cuts by adjusting their payout. As such, to 
repurchase shares rather than distributing dividends add Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001) 
and Hsieh and Wang (2008).  
In 1982 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the Rule 10b-18 in the U.S., 
covering the manner and time of repurchase, and the prices and the volume of shares 
repurchased. It reduces liability, or provides “safe harbor” provisions, from market 
manipulation charges for U.S. companies listed on the stock exchange that choose to buy back 
shares of their common stock. Hence, the SEC will not consider the firm in violation of anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as long as it relies within the four 
conditions of this rule. Following the passing of this rule, there is an increase of the number of 
industrial companies that performed share repurchases in the U.S and the total amount of 
repurchased value, which exceeded dividends in 1999/2000 (Skinner (2008), Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) and Grullon and Ikenberry (2000)). 
Although share repurchase activity started later in the EU than in the U.S., Von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) reports it evolving at a faster rate, surging in popularity in the late 1990s in 
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Europe. Moreover, over the same period, the number of European firms that pay dividends 
decreases, while the total amount of dividends paid rises and share repurchases step up. 
Furthermore, when comparing the trend of share repurchases and dividends in the U.S., Skinner 
(2008) realizes that the first has become as important, or even more, than the latter. Therefore, 
repurchases have become the dominant method of payout, leading to an excess of the total 
annual value of share repurchases in relation to dividends. FF and Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
find dividend payout ratios shrinking considerably and a boosting in share repurchases.  
Dealing with the disappearance of dividends, FF allocated part of the responsibility to changing 
firm characteristics tested by analysing the Size, Profitability and Investment Opportunities of 
U.S. listed firms. The climb of IPOs has oddly modified the population of publicly traded firms 
headed for firms that typically do not pay dividends, being small, low profit and with strong 
growth opportunities firms. The other part was due to the decrease in the propensity of firms to 
pay dividends. Maung and Mehrotra (2011) argues that the reason could be the diminished 
information asymmetry in the market and heightened signaling costs. Baker et al. (2015) 
remarks that past dividends are functioning as sharper reference points and signaling.  
Vermaelen (1981), Oded (2005), Bhattacharya and Jacobsen (2015) and Massa et al. (2007) 
defend that open-market buybacks usually occur when they represent a benefit for long term 
shareholders, meaning, when the stock is undervalued. Since companies announce it with no 
commitment, Babenko et al. (2012) adds that its purpose might be misleading the market. 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) adjoins that this type of strategy takes advantage of the 
uninformed outside investors that own an option to buy back stock. Andriosopoulos and Hoque 
(2011) found, in Germany, France and in the U.S., that Size, Cash Dividends and Ownership 
concentration have consistently a significant impact on the announcement of repurchases. If 
managers properly time repurchases, share prices will increase and will protect against 
takeovers (Bagwell (1991), Dittmar (2000) and Thein (2013)).  
Withal, the upturn of repurchases seems to be driven by the growth in stock options 
compensation, (Fenn and Liang (2001), Dittmar (2000) and Cuny et al. (2009)). In addition, 
attempts to reduce dilution caused by the exercise of stock option is also a main driver (Kahle 
(2002), Weisbenner (2000), Dittmar (2000), Weisbenner (1999) and Jolls (1998)). 
Consequently, Bens et al. (2003) explain that it results in the loss of some real investment 
projects whereas managers redirect funds towards repurchases. The pursuit of financial 
flexibility, which is affected by risk management and payout decisions (Bonaimé et al. (2014)), 
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is also a great driver for repurchases, concluded Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Brav et al. (2005), 
being negatively related to financial hedging within a firm. 
Finally, Grossman and Hart (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that the agency 
theory implies that returning cash to shareholders can control manager’s decisions. It lessens 
agency costs of free cash flow and systematic risk and rises stock prices. Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) defends there is a feeling of alleviation that bad managers, pressured by the board 
members and large investors, do not waste excess cash. Beyond, it says that when a company 
is at its growth phase, it tends to have positive NPV projects, higher earnings growth, CAPEX, 
and lower levels of free cash flow.  However, for a more mature firm, Berk et al. (1999) realizes 
there is a shrinkage in growth opportunities, meaning less investment required (less CAPEX 
and R&D expenses) giving place to agency problems. Hence, current assets represent a greater 
function in determining firm value as payout is increased (Fenn and Liang (2001) and Grullon 
et al. (2002)), leading to a decrease in systematic risk. In fact, Oded (2008) shows that mature 
firms prefer dividends, as they have more stable earnings (Jagannathan, Stephens, and 





3. Data & Methodology 
3.1. Data Extraction 
The analysis and comparison of the trend and drivers of dividends and share repurchases in the 
U.S. and in Europe focuses on the two main indexes. It comprises the largest companies by 
market capitalization of each region, the S&P 350 Europe Index (417 firms) and the S&P 500 
Index (467 firms). They are market indexes of vast liquidity and of huge importance in the U.S, 
Europe and Global Economies. Besides the size, the firms of these indexes are typically globally 
diversified players that affect various stakeholders. Lastly, in terms of their business activities 
they are under close examination, and they report their activities in several different ways given 
they are listed with high visibility. The timeframe of the study lies between 2001 and 2018, in 
order to cover the Financial Crisis, introduction of new regulations and other significant 
developments. It subdivides into the following periods: 2001-03, 2004-06, 2007-10, 2011-14 
and 2015-18. Hence, the variables for the periods are weighted averages considering the number 
of firms available in each year, including the joiners and excluding the leavers. 
The data used to analyse the elements of the indexes was retrieved, respectively, from 
CRSP/Compustat Merged, provided by Wharton Research Data Services, and Datastream, 
provided by Eikon Reuters. Therefore, the data on each constituent contains information on the 
following variables of Table A1.  
Then, the data has to receive some treatment and cleaning. Some industry groups are excluded 
to make the data collection process more feasible and to focus on a more homogeneous sample. 
Dittmar (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001) and FF show that financial firms (SIC Code 6,000-
6,999) have different reasons to repurchase stock from nonfinancial firms, and utility firms (SIC 
Code 4,900-4,949) have regulations on dividends payments. Therefore, these firms are 
excluded from the analysis, as well as firms without industry classification (SIC Code 9,900-
9,999). Only observations with non-missing values on DPS, Price, Common Dividends, 
Purchase of Common Stock and Total Assets and positive observations for Earnings and Market 
to Book ratio are considered.  
To avoid extreme observation from misrepresenting the results, it is necessary to circumvent 
the outliers. It is then decided to winsorize the observations of the dependent and independent 
variables that do not lie between the 1st and the 99th percentile, as it is the most accurate method 
for this sample and did not change a drastic amount of observations. 
3.2. Variable creation 
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In order to run the analysis, several variables are either retrieved or computed, which are then 
explained in Table A2.  
Two dummy (binary) variables arise: one for the variable Dividends Per Share and another for 
the Repurchase of Shares, taking the value 1, if the company pays dividends/ buys back shares, 
and the value 0, if the firm does not pay dividends/ does not buy back shares, respectively, for 
each firm in each period. Thus, for each year, each firm receives three different classifications, 
which are according to their dividend payments, share repurchases and the combination of both.  
According to Dividends payments, companies are split in the following two different 
categories: a) Dividend Payers (DP), in case the company pays dividends in the current year in 
analysis; b) Non-Payers (NP), in case the company does not pay dividends in the current year 
in analysis, which is then subdivided in: i) Never Paid Before (NPB), in case the company has 
never paid dividends in the previous years; and ii) Former Payer (FP), in case the company is 
not paying dividends in the current year in analysis but has paid in at least one of the previous 
years.  
Regarding Repurchases, companies are divided in the following two distinctive categories: a) 
Repurchase (R), if the firm repurchased shares in the current year in analysis; b) Non- 
Repurchase (NR), if the firm did not repurchase shares in the current year in analysis, which is 
consequently subdivided in: i) Never Repurchased Before (NRB), if the firm has not 
repurchased shares in the previous years; and ii) Former Repurchase (FR), if the firm is not 
repurchasing shares in the current year in analysis but has repurchased in at least one of the 
previous years. 
Combining the two methods of distributing cash, a deeper analysis was performed to better 
understand the relation between both behaviors, arising four categories: a) Dividend Payers & 
Repurchase (DPR); b) Non-Payer & Non-Repurchase (NPNR), further subdivided in: i) Former 
Payer & Former Repurchase (FPFR); ii) Never Paid Before & Never Repurchased Before 
(NPNRB); iii) Never Paid Before & Former Repurchase (NPBFR); and iv) Former Payer & 
Never Repurchased Before (FPNRB); c) Dividend Payers & Non-Repurchase (DPNR), then 
subdivided in: i) Dividend Payer & Never Repurchase Before (DPNRB); and Dividend Payer 
&Former Repurchase (DPFR); and d) Non-Payers & Repurchase (NPR), also subdivided in: i) 
Never Paid Before & Repurchase (NBFR); and ii) Former Payer & Repurchase (FPR). 
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Nevertheless, one drawback of this method is that firms which have distributed cash, either 
through dividends or share repurchases, before 2001 (Europe) and before 2000 (U.S.), can be 
misallocated within the categories of Non-Payers and Non-Repurchase. Still, it does not have 
significant impact the results obtained.  
3.3. Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1. Logit Regression Analysis 
As a way of determining which characteristics drive the choice of payout policy of firms in 
Europe and in the U.S., two types of logistic regressions were run. Each regression is run for 
Dividends Payers and Share Repurchases, for Europe, for the U.S. and for the full sample with 
Region as a Dummy variable. This model (logit model), uses a logistic function to model a 
binary dependent variable, i.e. with two possible values. The standard logit regression 
investigates the dividends and share repurchases in isolation, one regression for each without 
considering the other as an independent variable.  
a) Propensity to pay dividends for Europe (Model 1) and for the U.S. (Model 2) 
b) Propensity to buy back shares for Europe (Model 4) and for the U.S. (Model 5) 




) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio
+ β4InvestmentOpportunities + β5Profitability 
c) Model 3: Propensity to pay dividends, with Region as a Dummy variable 
d) Model 6: Propensity to buy back shares, with Region as a Dummy variable 




) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio
+ β4InvestmentOpportunities + β5Profitability + β6Region 
3.3.2. Log-Linear Regression Analysis 
After analyzing the determinants of the likelihood to adopt one of the methods to distribute cash 
to shareholders, a Multiple Log-Linear Regression is used to study the determinants of the 
amount of Dividends and Share Buybacks. It takes the form of a function whose logarithm 
                                                 
1 p = P (Y = 1) 
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equals a linear combination of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the amount paid as dividends or share repurchases. 
a) Aggregate Amount of Dividends for European firms (Model 7) and for 
American firms (Model 8) 
Ln(𝐷𝑖𝑣) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio + β4Profitability 
+ β5InvestmentOpportunities 
b) Aggregate Amount of Share Repurchases for Europe (Model 10) and for the 
U.S. (Model 11) 
Ln(𝑅𝑒𝑝) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio + β4Profitability 
+ β5InvestmentOpportunities 
c) Model 9: Aggregate Amount of Dividends, with Region as a Dummy 
Ln(𝐷𝑖𝑣) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio + β4Profitability 
+ β5InvestmentOpportunities + β6Region 
a) Model 12: Aggregate Amount of Share Repurchases, with Region as a Dummy 
Ln(𝑅𝑒𝑝) = β0 + β1Size + β2Cash Holdings + β3Leverage Ratio + β4Profitability 




4. Time Trends 
4.1. Evolution of firms according to each payout policy group 
This paper aims to investigate the progress of the distribution of cash through paying dividends 
or buying back shares in Europe and in the U.S., throughout the 2001-18 period. Earlier, 
companies were categorized in a) Dividend Payers; b) Non-Payers, subdivided into i) Never 
Paid Before, and ii) Former Payer, and c) Repurchase. Overall, Table A3 shows the proportion 
of firms belonging to the S&P 350 Europe Index paying dividends in this period increased, 
from 84% in 2001 to 91% in 2018. Companies under the S&P 500 Index also increased in a 
similar magnitude, from 73% in the beginning of the analysis to 79% in the last year. 
Repurchases followed the same path, registering subtler hikes in Europe of 107% and 55% in 
the U.S. over these years, for the same period. Although Non-Payers in the U.S. represent, 
approximately, 10 p.p. more in the beginning than in Europe, as payers showed an upward 
trend, these decreased 7 p.p. and 6 p.p., respectively, along the period.  
Analysing the trend over the years (see Figure 1) it is possible to notice the slight impact of the 
Dotcom Crash over the period 2000-02 period. The proportion of firms paying dividends 
declined to 71% in the U.S. and to 82% in Europe. Repurchases behave in the same way 
decreasing to 24% in Europe and to 53% in America.  
It is visible that buybacks have been considerably more frequent around the world during the 
last decade, especially from 2003 onwards. In fact, the regulation introduced in the late 1990s 
in several European countries has completely changed a firm’s ability to repurchase its own 
shares. Moreover, Sakinç (2017) shows the new regulation on buyback programs (EC Directive 
2003/6/EC and EC Regulation 2273/2003), initiated by the European Commission in late 2003, 
aims at separating them from insider dealing and market manipulation, providing “safe harbor” 
provisions. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) found SEC passing 
the Rule 10b-18 in the U.S. in 1982, also providing “safe harbor provisions” for repurchasing, 
to be a main driver as it is tax-favored as well as more flexible than paying dividends. Thus, it 
creates a legal process for buybacks allowing companies to start repurchasing their stock 
massively. Withal, in 2003 the SEC amended the rule to include block trades so that they stop 
serving the purpose of manipulating the stock market. As a result, in the 2003-08 period (year 
before the impact of the crisis is revealed) the percentage of firms repurchasing shares rises 
142% in Europe (from 91 firms in 2003) and 68% in the U.S. (from 142 firms in 2003). 
Nonetheless, after this period, both share buybacks and dividends soar again. The latter is 
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reinforced by the 2003 tax cut, which lowered the individual income tax burden to 15% from a 
maximum rate of 35%.  
Some years later, the Financial Crisis in the U.S. in the period 2007-08, which led to the 
European sovereign debt crisis in 2009, motivated the second lowest values for the timeframe. 
As such, in 2009, a modest slippery of dividend payers is verified from 88% to 82% in Europe 
and from 75% to 72% in America. Nonetheless, the impact in Europe is higher as dividend 
payers shrink 10 p.p. from 2007 (year that registered its highest). Concerning buybacks, the 
impact was more severe, plummeting 39% in Europe (from 67% to 41%), and 26% in the U.S. 
(from 84% to 62%). 
In 2018, another tax bill is ruled. The three main points are the decrease in corporate tax rate 
from 35% to 21%, the reduction of abroad corporate income brought back from 35% to 8-15.5% 
and the exemption of foreign income for U.S. tax propelling repurchases. Although it is quite 
recent, the fraction of firms repurchasing shares increased three p.p. to 55% in Europe and to 
90% in the U.S. in 2018. 
Diving into the comparison between the two indexes, one can take three interesting takeaways. 
First, the buyback behavior of European firms is systematically reduced compared with 
American firms. There is more a less a constant difference of 30% of the amount of firms that 
repurchase shares to the total of firms in analysis. Second, there is still a consistent difference 
regarding dividends, of only 10%, but in the opposite way. Meaning, Europe is the one yielding 
higher portion of dividend payers. Third, despite the scale in repurchase activity in Europe, it 
was only able to narrow the difference in respect to dividend payers (from 56% to 33%). 
Therefore, dividends remain the dominant form of payout, as it displayed a small but steady 
growth, offsetting part of the growth in repurchases.  In contrast, in the U.S. the path is other as 
it started with a difference of 15% and soon vanished, in 2005, driven by the reasons mentioned 
above. Thus, firms that repurchase shares (77%) surpassed firms paying dividends (76%). It 
keeps as the predominant form of payout until the end of the period, only experiencing a step 
back in 2009 but immediately recovering in the following year. 
Then, to better analyse the behavior of the firms, it considers both forms of payout together, as 
previously mentioned. These categories also clearly suffer with the crisis and regulations.  
The members of the four categories of the S&P 350 Europe Index paying dividends and buying 
back shares decline in the 2001-02 period. It is in line with the Dotcom Crash, as all categories, 
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Dividend Payer & Repurchase (22%), Dividend Payer & Non-Repurchase (61%), Non-Payer 
& Repurchase (2%) and Non-Payer & Non-Repurchase (15%) get to the extreme values in 2002 
of the full timeframe. As explained before, the Financial Crisis heavily damaged these values. 
Hence, just before that, Dividend Payers & Repurchase (61%) arrives at their highest amount, 
in 2008. Whilst, Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase (4%) in 2007 and Dividend Payers & Non-
Repurchase (26%) in 2008 get to their lowest amounts. As expected, all firms except those that 
only repurchase go under large changes, as the proportion of firms keeps on the 6% level in the 
2008-10 period, then diminishing again to 3%. Dividend Payers & Repurchase went under an 
arduous time, falling 42% to a level of 35%, contrasting with the increase of Non-Payers & 
Non-Repurchase (87%) and Dividend Payers Only (77%), driven by the collapse of 
repurchases. Following, it decreases until 2018, to half (6%) for firms with no payout policy, 
to 36% for Dividend Payers Only and to 55% for firms that disburse cash in both ways. 
Regarding the S&P 500 Index, the firms follow a similar road as the tendency described above, 
but verifying a higher percentage for the Dividend Payers & Repurchase over the years in 
relation to the S&P 350 Europe Index. In 2001, the difference is 21 p.p. and, in 2018, it is 16 
p.p., although verifying the lowest spread of 6% p.p. in 2008 and, approximately, 9 p.p. in 2009. 
As in Europe, companies that only repurchase in the U.S. do not suffer any impact through the 
2008-10 period, recording a fraction of firms of 18% in 2006 and in 2018, despite minor 
changes in the between. Lastly, as expected, Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase firms and dividend 
payers only, also driven by the behavior para repurchases, suffer a jump (respectively, to 11% 
and 27%) in 2009, then decreasing until 2018 (respectively, to 3% and 7%). 
Curiously, at the beginning of the period, buyback activity was already more important for 
dividend payers than non-payers both in Europe (88% versus 12%) and in the U.S. (77% versus 
23%). However, in 2018, it became even more clear and solid, especially for the firms 
belonging to the S&P 350 Europe. Consequently, the difference on repurchases between firms 
that distribute cash by paying dividends and by firms that do not pursue this form of payout 
expanded in both regions, in Europe is currently 95% vs 5%, while in the U.S. it increased to 





Figure 1 presents the counts and fraction of firms in Europe and in the U.S. in each category over the 2001-18 period. The 
sample includes S&P 350 Europe and S&P 500 firms. Utilities (SIC Code 4900-4949), Financial Services (SIC Code 6000-
6999) and Non Classifiable (SIC Code 9900-9999) firms are excluded. Panel A and C: Dividend Payers paid dividends in year 
t; Non-Payers did not. Repurchase are firms that repurchased shares in year t. Panel B and D: Dividend Payers & Repurchase 
engaged in both forms of payout in year t. Dividend Payers Only and Repurchase Only firms just paid dividends and 
repurchased, respectively, in year t. Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase did not distribute cash to shareholders in year t. Panel A 
and B contain European firms. Panel C and D contain A.   
Panel A: Fraction of European Firms (unrelated) Panel B: Fraction of European Firms (related) 
Panel C: Fraction of American Firms (unrelated)  Panel D: Fraction of American Firms (related)  
Figure 1: Fraction of European and American firms by payout policy group for each year 
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4.2. Payout Ratios 
Following the analysis on the trend of firms paying dividend and firms repurchasing shares, the 
focus is now on payout ratios using the absolute values of the aggregate sample of the 
representatives of both indexes.  
Underlying Jagannathan et al. (2000), firms tend to use permanent earnings for the dividend 
payout while unexpected earnings to fund share repurchases, suggesting that buybacks are 
complements to dividends. Bhargava (2010) shows a positive and significant relationship 
between earnings and dividends per share. For companies that only repurchase, earnings might 
explain it in a similar way as Lintner (1956) does with the relationship between dividends and 
earnings. 
By examining Figure 2, it is possible to realize a tremendous growth over the 2001-18 period 
on absolute aggregate earnings. As such, in the S&P Europe 350 Index firms grew 191%, or at 
a CAGR (Constant Annual Growth Rate) of 6% (from $231Tn in 2001 to $672Tn in 2018) and 
in the S&P 500 Index firms it jumped 274%, at a CAGR of 8% (from $189Tn in 2001 to $706Tn 
in 2018). The dividends and repurchases behaved accordingly by also drastically increasing 
throughout the same timeframe. The CAGRs are 9% and 8%, for Europe, and in the U.S. are 
9% and 11%, respectively. Thereupon, it results in a total payout ratio in 2018 of 69% in Europe 
(48% in 2001) and of 101% in the U.S. (78% in 2001). The impressive riding of cash returned 
to shareholders over this period being higher than the growth in earnings explains this intense 
growth. 
In spite of this general positive trail, Table A4 shows the course has not always been smooth; 
the companies have been through some oscillations, reflected in the evolution of the payout 
ratios. As such, the harsh drop on repurchases in both Europe and U.S., arisen by the strong halt 
marked by the Financial Crisis, is evident on the contraction of the repurchase payout ratio, 
which is contrasted with the increment of the dividend payout ratio. In the 2007-09 period, the 
repurchases diminished 64% in Europe (from $148Tn in 2007 to $34Tn in 2009) and 58% in 
the U.S. (from $382Tn in 2007 to $103Tn in 2009). It causes the repurchase payout ratio in 
Europe to suffer a downturn of 64% (from 25% in 2007 to 9% in 2009), as well as in the U.S. 
of 69%, (from 82% in 2007 to 25% in 2009).  
The dividends of American firms decrease at a similar and proportional pace as its Earnings, 
though enough to keep the dividend payout ratio at the same level (goes only from 33% to 
36%). Yet, after dividends have reach its second low in 2008 of 39% in Europe, a tiny raise in 
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the aggregate value of dividends of $4Tn contrasting to a bulky deterioration on Earnings of 
$135Tn gives place to a dividend payout ratio of 55%.  
Actually, dividends are the main tool of distributing cash to shareholders with firms adopting a 
more solid payout policy. During a crisis, companies would rather cut on share buybacks than 
on dividends, thus the last proving to be more resilient in such a hard time. Then, it is coherent 
and conforming with the signaling power inherent in dividends, of committing future free cash 
flows. More concretely, a dividend increase announcement by a company is a clear indication 
of positive future performance, while a decrease in dividend payout tend to portend negative 
future prospects. Hence, managers are utterly averse to cut dividends, only doing so in a last 
case scenario. 
Interestingly, by taking a close look at the payout mix on Figure 3, it is possible to have a clear 
view on the aforementioned. The change in the payout ratios in the U.S. corresponded to a 
turnaround in payout mixes. After American firms paying out 29% as dividends and 71% as 
buying back shares in 2007, in 2009 it inverted to 59% by paying dividends versus 41% by 
doing repurchases, a more balanced distribution. Whereas in Europe it just widened more as 
dividends, which go from 62% in 2007 to 86% in 2009, were already the main choice of payout, 
being 2009 the year where the maximum was registered. Soon after 2009, the overall trend 
continued, meaning, started reverting the impact of the happenings occurred until 2009. The 
recovering of all variables in both regions, with a special focus for the repurchases that had the 
best improvement in relative terms, reveals this reversal. For instance, it grew 66% in Europe 
while it more than doubled in the U.S., landing in $218Tn in 2010 from $103Tn, marking the 
beginning of a new increasing tendency. 
Regardless of the recoil in the 2009, the surge in earnings also boosted in dividends and 
repurchases in the elements of the indexes, originating historical ceilings and high values. 
Along these lines, in 2018, total absolute payout is $466Tn in Europe (CAGR of 9%) and 
$711Tn in the U.S. (CAGR of 10%). Then repurchases in Europe total $112Tn (growth of 70% 
compared to 2017), representing 24% of the total payout, and in the U.S. total $421Tn (smaller 
growth in relative terms, of 11%, compared to 2017), which symbolize 59% of the total payout. 
The dividends represent the remnant, 76% ($354Tn) in Europe and 41% ($289Tn) in the U.S. 
in the last period.  
In order to understand more clearly the differences in behavior of the largest firms based on 
market capitalization in Europe compared to the ones in the U.S., one can dive into the payout 
18 
 
mixes along the years. In Europe the gap has always been broad, showing a predominance for 
dividends (even with an evident arising of repurchases, taking longer to become the 
predominant choice), with similar values at the starting point of 75% and finishing point of 
25%. For repurchases in the U.S., an opposite movement emerges. In fact, preference for 
dividends and repurchases has always been side to side, experiencing some brief changes, but 
mainly the latter has been the preferred one. Only twice, in 2003 with 49% of the total payout, 
rapidly increased until 2007, and in 2009 with 41% out of the total payout ratio, the path was 
different. Then, after 2010, it remained at stable levels, ending the period in study at 59%. 
Interestingly, based on Figure 4, repurchases were strengthening in the U.S. compared to 
dividends, as increasingly cash was being used for buying back shares per unit of dividends. 
Whilst in Europe this amount was much lower and only slightly increasing. Then, the trend was 
reverted by the impact of the Financial Crisis. As previously seen, the use and aggregate amount 
of share repurchases lessens remarkably compared to dividends, which had somewhat 
decreased as well, in the 2007-09 period. 
   
Figure 2 reports annual information on aggregate cash distributions to shareholders and respective payout ratios 
for a sample of European and American firms. Panel A represents the European aggregate payout ratio. Panel B 
represents the American aggregate payout ratio. Panel C represents the European absolute aggregate payout ratio. 
Panel D represents the American absolute aggregate payout ratio. The data consist of all firm-year observations 
Panel A: European Firms Aggregate payout ratio Panel B: American Firms Aggregate payout ratio 
Panel C: European Absolute Aggregate Payout Ratio  Panel D: American Absolute Aggregate Payout Ratio 
Figure 2: Aggregate cash distributions to shareholders 
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on Compustat and Datastream over the 2001-18 period, which contain information on the following variables: 
Repurchases, Dividends and Earnings. Repurchase is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred 
stocks minus any reduction in the value (redemption value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding. 










2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Dividends/Total Payout Repurchases/Total Payout







2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Dividends/Total Payout Repurchases/Total Payout
Panel B: Payout Mix of American Firms  
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Figure 3 reports the aggregate payout mix for European and American firms. Panel A represents payout mix for 
Figure 3 reports the payout mix of the aggregate distribution of cash to shareholders. Panel A represents the payout 
mix of European firms. Panel B represents the payout mix of American firms. The data consist of all firm-year 
observations on Compustat and Datastream over the 2001-18 period, which contain information on the following 
variables: Repurchases and Dividends. Repurchase is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred 
stocks minus any reduction in the value (redemption value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding. 
Dividend is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock.  
 
Figure 4 reports the annual amount spent on a share buyback per unit of dividend for a sample of firms in Europe 
and in the U.S. The data consist of all firm-year observations on Compustat and Datastream over the 2001-18 
period, which contain information on the following variables: Repurchases, Dividends. Repurchase is the 
expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks minus any reduction in the value (redemption value) 
of the net number of preferred shares outstanding. Dividend is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the 
common stock.  
4.3. Firm Characteristics 
As stated in Data & Methodology, this paper studies the characteristics of the firms in both 
indexes, according to each payout policy, in the timeframe in analysis (2001-18). Table A5 
reports the five characteristics of the sample firms, which are Size, Cash Holdings, Investment 
Opportunities, Leverage Ratio and Profitability. It reveals various fascinating facts and 
conclusions on the relation between firm characteristics and the payout policy adopted, 
according to each index. 
Figure 4: Annual amount spent on a share repurchases per unit of dividend 




The best proxy for Size is Total Assets. It is a measure of the extent of information asymmetry 
(Raju L Hyderabad (2013)). In fact, a small firm is under less coverage by analysts and media 
and tight provisions of the regulators and the accounting standards govern less. It then leads to 
more information asymmetry than large firms, supported by Vermaelen (1981) and Mitchell 
(2007). In addition, Aivazian and Booth (2003) says it is a proxy for financial market access of 
the firm. Larger companies tend to have better market access and more funds available, so they 
should be capable of paying higher dividends. Indeed, FF shows that dividend payers are more 
prone to be proportionally bigger than non-payers are. Consequently, it is expected a positive 
relation between size and dividend payments. Alok Bhargava (2010). Leeuw (2016), Dittmar 
(2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Ikenberry et al. (1995), and Dimitris Andriosopoulos and 
Hafiz Hoque (2011) confirm these findings. The latter validates it and adds that larger and more 
mature firms are more likely to repurchase. For that reason, firm size positively relates with 
repurchases, but in a smaller dimension.  
As expected, dividend-paying firms are larger than firms that buy back shares. For example, 
for European companies that pay dividends and repurchase shares, the average total assets is 
$30,144M, whereas in the U.S. it is, $30,652M. For firms in Europe that only pay dividends, 
the average total assets of $31,843Bn is greater than in the U.S., which has $26,952M in average 
total assets. For firms without payout policy, in Europe ($13,552M) they are much smaller than 
in the U.S. ($5,589M). The ones that only repurchase are much larger in Total Assets in Europe 
($15,067M) than in the U.S. ($13,194M). 
Firms in Europe paying dividends (Total Assets of $30,964M) are, approximately, more than 
twice the size as those not including dividends in their payout policy (Total Assets of 
$13,937M), while those repurchasing are similar in size ($28,836M). In the U.S. it is possible 
to infer the same relationship, as firms redistributing cash in dividends (Total Assets of 
$29,923M) are almost the double in size compared to the ones not paying at all (Total Assets 
of $15,178M), while companies repurchasing represent $26,730M in Total Assets. 
Although the substantial increase on average total assets in Europe and in the U.S. is transversal 
across all types of payout policies, firms that only buy back shares in Europe experience a 
decrease in size. Additionally, during the Financial Crisis, the size of firms paying dividends 
and firms repurchasing intensifies in general, exceptionally in American firms. The results then 
infer the proposed by the literature, that dividend-paying firms and firms that buy back shares, 
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both in Europe and in the U.S., tend to be larger than ones that do not engage in these types of 
cash distribution to shareholders. In addition, firms only repurchasing are half the size as those 
only paying dividends. 
4.3.2. Cash Holdings  
Then, another variable that plays an important role in defining the payout policy is Cash 
Holdings. Following Jensen’s free cash-flow hypothesis, positive free cash flow pressures 
management to enlarge payouts to shareholders. If management fails to do so and prefers to use 
free cash flow on negative net present value projects, it predicts a decline on firm value. Thence, 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and management are quite severe and might induce 
the company to distribute cash to shareholders to reduce them. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) 
reports that the propensity to repurchase increases with large cash holdings, implying a positive 
correlation between cash and repurchases. Yet, it reduces the propensity of paying cash 
dividends although it increases the amount paid for a cash dividend payer. 
The average Cash Holdings in firms in Europe that only pay dividends is 10.6%, increasing to 
11.5% for the ones that engage in repurchases, giving already the hint on a positive relationship 
between holding cash and buying back shares. The expected negative relationship of cash 
holdings with dividends is also present in Europe, as firms not applying any payout policy hold 
15.5% of cash and firms only repurchasing carry 16.7% of cash. Firms in the U.S. provide 
strength to this argument as the difference is even ampler. As such, dividend-paying firms that 
repurchase shares hold, on average, 11.5% of cash. As seen before, if one excludes the ones not 
repurchasing, this value drops to 8.4%. In contrast, showing the vehemence of dividends, firms 
that do not pay dividends nor buy shares back tend to maintain 19.6% cash, whereas a firm only 
does share repurchases, on average, carry 21.2% of cash. More broadly, European firms that 
repurchase shares, 12.0%, and firms that do not pay dividends, 15.9%, hold less cash, on 
average, than the American ones, 13.4% for firms that buy back shares and 20.7% for non-
payers. On the other hand, dividend-payers tend to possess the same amount regardless the 
region (more a less 11%).  
As a final note, S&P 350 Europe index constituents’ cash holdings decreased for non-payers 
(from 16.2% to 13.2%, although registering a jump in the period preceding the Financial Crisis, 
2004-09, getting to 19.0%) and for repurchase only firms (from 12.5% to 11.8%). The path of 
dividend-payers is quite stable (only suffering minor fluctuations), increasing 3 p.p. from 2001 
to 2018. On the other side, S&P 500 Index’s firms behaved according in respect to firms doing 
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buybacks, in which the respective cash holdings started as 11.7% and finished as 13.3%, the 
opposite tendency compared to Europe. Non-payers also lessen their cash holdings from 19.7% 
to 18.8%, even though in the 2011-14 period they reached 21.9%, period in which dividend-
payers had the highest jump (from 7.4% to 11.7%). This way, the results allow to surmise the 
anticipated relationship of cash holdings with payout policy. A firm that repurchases tends to 
hold slightly more cash, in contrast to a firm that pays dividends. This confirms on the striking 
difference in Cash Holdings that a firm only repurchasing has compared to one only paying 
dividends, in both indexes.  
4.3.3. Investment Opportunities 
Investment Opportunities, with Market to Book Ratio as a proxy, is a good indicator to capture 
a firm’s under or overvaluation (Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Dechow et al. (1999)). As such, 
Ikenberry et al. (2002) reports that a firm buy back more shares when it is undervalued rather 
than overvalued. From Barth and Kasznik (1999) it is expected a lower Market-to-Book Ratio 
to indicate lower intangibles, as they are not identified as accounting assets, but are returned in 
market value of equity. Hence, it implies a negatively relationship between Market-to-Book 
Ratio and the propensity to repurchase shares. In the case of an undervalued firm, the 
management pays less for the shares than its belief on how much they are worth. Contrarily, a 
lower Market-to-Book Ratio indicates more undervaluation as market value is lower relative to 
book value. Furthermore, according to the pecking order theory, a firm rather finance itself with 
first internally, with retained earnings. If not available, then opt for debt. Only in a last case 
scenario a firm should finance itself through the issue of equity. Therefore, companies with 
higher investment opportunities are more likely to hold more cash. DeAngelo et al. (2004) says 
low investment opportunities, on average, lead to the payment of dividends and Alok Bhargava 
(2010) agrees, stating that investments have a positive and significant relationship with 
dividends per share. Whereas Aivazian and Booth (2003) joints that more growth opportunities 
should mean lower dividend payments. 
As foreseen, both S&P 350 Europe Index and S&P 500 Index firms are in line with the literature 
on this variable just referred above. In fact, non-payers reveal to have, on average, the highest 
investment opportunities in Europe, 5.5%, and in the U.S., 6.6%. In opposition, dividend-payers 
are the firms that have less investment opportunities, 2.8% in Europe and 3.0% in the U.S. 
Repurchases are on the midfield, given that they have a positive relationship with investment 
opportunities in Europe (3.2%) and in the U.S (3.8%). 
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However, by combining both forms of payout, it is possible to take some other conclusions. 
The highest investment opportunities belong to firms that engage in both forms of payout in 
Europe (11.5%) and in the U.S. (11.5%). In Europe, firms initially have 12.3% of investment 
opportunities and, in 2018, it declines to 11.5%, registering a more intense decrease to 10.5% 
during the Financial Crisis. In the U.S. there is surge to 24.4% in the 2015-18 period (from 
8.1% in the 2001-03 period). The group with lowest investment opportunities is the one with 
firms paying dividends but not doing share buybacks in Europe (2.7%) and in the U.S. (2.6%). 
Nonetheless, firms with no payout policy went in the opposite route over the timeframe in 
Europe (5.8% to 2.7%) compared to the U.S. (5.7% to 13.5%). Companies that only buy back 
shares had their investment opportunities slipping in Europe (from 5.4% to 4.5%) and in the 
U.S. (from 6.6% to 6.3%), where it is constantly greater than in Europe. As expected, firms of 
both indexes that have high investment opportunities pay less dividends and do more 
repurchases. 
4.3.4. Leverage Ratio 
Furthermore, Leverage Ratio is also a variable of importance to be analysed regarding payout 
policy. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) shows high-leveraged firms are less likely to pay 
dividends and Aivazian and Booth (2003) adds that they make lower dividend payments, 
inferring that financial constraints influence dividend policy. Regarding repurchases, Bagwell 
and Shoven (1988) suggests large levels of debt increase its likelihood. Kahle (2002) concludes 
that it prompt in lower repurchases, while Hovakimian et al. (2001) accordingly displays that 
lower ratios increase the propensity to buy back shares. Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue firms buying back shares reveals the management’s preference 
to use debt instead of equity to reach the right Leverage Ratio. Hence, Mitchell and Dharmawan 
(2007) and Dittmar (2000) propose that below target debt ratios increases the likelihood to 
repurchase shares and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) that repurchasing shares more 
frequently represents lower debt ratios for those firms.  
Supporting the literature, S&P 350 Europe Index dividend-paying firms hold, on average, a 
Leverage Ratio of 25.4%, having decreased from 27.9% to 24.4% along with an increase in 
dividends. However, in the U.S. the trend revealed the opposite, going from 27.0% to 32.1%, 
resulting in an average of 26.8%. Moreover, a decrease in the firms in the category of 
repurchases in Europe, from 28.2% to 24.6% (average over the years of 25.3%) contrasts with 
the large increase in the U.S., from 23.9% to 31%, reaching an average over the timeframe of 
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25.3% as well. Additionally, non-dividend payers also behaved in opposite ways, as the 
leverage ratio of those in Europe is, on average, 29.7% (from 31.6% in the first period to 30.0% 
in the last one), while in the U.S. it surged from 23.9% to 31.0%, arriving to an average of 
25.3% for all periods. 
Nonetheless, the joint payout policies allow enriching this interpretation. In Europe, the highest 
leverage ratios (30.9%) are on firms that do not have a payout policy. It remained around the 
same values along the periods, from 30.8% in the first period to 30.2% in the last one, slightly 
increasing to 32.1% during the Financial Crisis. It diverges with the U.S. firms with a ratio of 
24.4%, which demonstrated an acute increase over the years, from 23.6% to 28.1%. Whereas 
in the latter the payout group with higher Leverage Ratio is the dividend payers only with a 
ratio of 27.9%, which recorded a sharp increase from 28.8% in the 2001-03 period to 34.6% in 
2015-18 period. However, it opposes to Europe, which has 25.9%, resulting of a decline to 
24.4% from 28.1%. Two other downturns in Europe took place in the firms that repurchase, of 
non-payers, from 28.1% in the 2001-03 period to 24.4% in the last period, and of payers, from 
27.3% to 24.3%. In the U.S., firms that only repurchase increased their Leverage Ratio to 
27.8%, from 17.6% in the beginning, and payers that repurchase reached 31.8% in the 2015-18 
period (having started with 25.7% in the first period). Interestingly, firms paying dividends in 
the U.S. have higher levels of debt in comparison with the ones in Europe, which show a 
negative relationship. Regarding repurchases the relationship is the same, meaning a firm with 
good levels of debt tend to repurchase. 
4.3.5. Profitability 
Profitability is measured by the Return on Assets (ROA). In consonance with Jensen’s free 
cash-flow hypothesis, the firms with higher likelihood to distribute cash to shareholders are the 
less profitable ones as they have less investment opportunities. However, Lee and Suh (2011) 
reports significant and positive effects of profitability on the amount of repurchases realized by 
dividend-paying firms. Withal, Von Eije and Megginson (2008) realizes that the likelihood of 
European firms to repurchase is explained by profitability, whereas DeAngelo et al. (2004) 
states that high profitable firms are more likely to pay dividends, while low profitable ones are 
not paying dividends. 
In keeping with the hypothesis above described, of a positive relationship between profitability 
and paying dividends and buying back shares, the sample in analysis comes to confirm it. Firms 
in all categories with some kind of payout policy increased its profitability over the years in 
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both regions. However, for firms that only pay dividends in the U.S., profitability falls to 0.5% 
in the last period from 3.4% in the first (recording an average of 3.7%). In Europe, this value is 
6.4%, although it starts with 5.1% and finished with 5.5% (in the between a high profitability 
is verified in the 2004-06 period of 8.1%, and 7.5% in the 2007-10 period).  Then, companies 
redistributing cash in both ways show an increase of profitability in both regions relative to 
other firms. The profitability of European firms goes from 7.6% to 8.4%. The average of the 
full period is 8.8%, given the high profitability in the 2004-6 period, with 9.8%, and in the 
2007-10 period, with 9.2%. In the U.S., it starts with 5.0% for repurchase only and 7.0% for 
both and finished with 8.2% and 7.7%, respectively (ending up with, on average, 8.2% and 
8.0%). Regarding firms with no payout policy, over the years in both regions it increases, 
reaching a negative profitability of -1.1% in Europe and a positive one in the U.S. firms of 
1.1%. 
In consonance with it, the category showing higher profitability is firms that repurchase in 
Europe (on average 8.4%, an increase from 6.7% to 8.2%) and in the U.S. (on average 8.0%, 
reached 7.8% in the final period, from 6.5% in the first). At the same time, dividend payers go 
under a similar path at a similar pace, in which firms in Europe arrived at 7.6% and firms in the 
U.S. reach 7.1%, on average. Overall, the positive relationship between profitability and 
dividends and buybacks holds for both regions. However, while in Europe firms only paying 
dividends are, on average, 60% more profitable than those only repurchasing, in the U.S. they 




5. Empirical Analysis 
Succeeding the analysis of the characteristics of the firms, the goal is to examine the impact of 
each explanatory variable on the propensity to opt for one of the ways to distribute cash to 
shareholders and on the amounts of dividends paid and shares repurchased (for the 2001-18 
period).  
Then, there is a model for both regions, Europe and the U.S., separately. Lastly, a new model 
including all observations with a respective Dummy for the variable region arises. For every 
model, as stated before, the analysis is done for significance levels of 0.1%, 1.0% and 5.0%. 
 
Table 1 reports the summary results for the Logistic regressions estimated over the 2001-18 period. The dependent 
variable of model (1), (2), and (3) is 1 if the firm is Dividend Payers and 0 in case it is a Non-Payer. The dependent 
variable of model (4), (5), and (6) is 1 if the firm Repurchases Shares and 0 in case it does not. Model (1) and (4) 
correspond to European firms, model (2) and (5) correspond to American Firms, and model (3) and (6) include all 
observations, using a Dummy Variable, Region, which takes the value of 1 for an American Firm, and 0 for a 
European one. The other explanatory variables used are Average Firm Size (measured by the natural logarithm of 
Total Assets), Cash Holdings (Cash and Short-Term Investments to Total Assets), Investment Opportunities 
(measured by Market to Book Ratio), Leverage Ratio (Total Debt over Total Assets), Profitability (ROA as proxy, 
which is Net Income/ Total Assets). The table shows the regression coefficients for every model analysed. In 
parenthesis is the standard error.  The asterisks characterize the significance of the values for different significance 
levels (*** α<0.001; ** α<0.01; * α<0.05) using the Wald test. 
5.1. Logit Regressions on the propensity to pay dividends and buy back shares 
The first models, represented in Table 1, are logistic regressions to study the propensity to pay 
dividends and repurchase shares. A positive βi implies exp(βi) to be greater than one, thus the 
odds and probability increase with the respective variable. The opposite verifies for a negative 
βi. 
Table 1: Logistic regressions summary results 
Model
(1) -1,000 ** 0,408 *** -6,115 *** 0,031 * -2,350 *** 13,457 ***
(0,330) (0,035) (0,470) (0,013) (0,335) (0,757)
(2) -3,557 *** 0,536 *** -4,696 *** -0,002 0,630 * 5,145 ***
(0,346) (0,037) (0,281) (0,005) (0,275) (0,525)
(3) -1,566 *** 0,442 *** -5,290 *** 0,004 -0,419 * 8,201 *** -1,027 ***
(0,223) (0,025) (0,236) (0,005) (0,208) (0,417) (0,060)
(4) -1,601 *** 0,136 *** -0,503 0,038 *** -0,624 ** 5,901 ***
(0,202) (0,020) (0,316) (0,008) (0,214) (0,475)
(5) -1,008 ** 0,169 *** 0,256 0,025 ** -0,063 9,379 ***
(0,335) (0,034) (0,318) (0,009) (0,280) (0,624)
(6) -1,880 *** 0,149 *** -0,153 0,033 *** -0,432 * 7,249 *** 1,286 ***
(0,172) (0,017) (0,220) (0,006) (0,169) (0,378) (0,046)
Leveraget ROAt Region
Coefficient
Int Assetst Casht MBt
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5.1.1. Model 1 and 2: Propensity to pay dividends 
Starting with the model on propensity to pay dividends, regarding the firms in the S&P 350 
Europe Index, the findings confirm a positive relationship for Size, Investment Opportunities 
and Profitability and a negative for Cash Holdings and Leverage Ratio. Hence, in Europe, larger 
firms with higher profitability and growth opportunities and that hold less Cash Holdings and 
a lower Leverage Ratio are more prone to pay dividends. These relationships are statistically 
significant for all variables according to any value of significance, except for Investment 
Opportunities, that only shows to be significance for a significance level of 5.0% or higher. By 
taking a closer look at the average slope of the coefficients, three variables stand out, the strong 
negative average slope of Cash Holdings (B2 = -6.115) and Leverage Ratio (B3 = -2.350) 
contrasting to a heavy positive slope of Profitability (B5 = 13.457).  
Concerning the S&P 500 Index firms, it is possible to infer the same connections between the 
explanatory variables and dividends, apart from Leverage Ratio that has a positive and 
Investment Opportunities that have a negative relationship with the propensity to pay dividends. 
Therefore, in the U.S., firms that are more prone to pay dividends hold higher Leverage Ratio 
and lower growth opportunities. However, Investment Opportunities is not a significant 
variable for any if the 3 significance levels used; also, Leverage Ratio is significant for a 5% 
level. Making a comparison of the impact by analysing the average coefficients, one can infer 
that besides Leverage Ratio (B3 = 0.630), which was already discussed, the coefficient on size 
(B1 = 0.540) is similar to the one in Europe. However, regarding profitability (B5 = 5.145) it is 
less than half than in Europe, whereas the effect of holding Cash is less negative (B2 = -4.696). 
5.1.2. Model 3: Propensity to pay dividends with Region as a Dummy variable 
By combining the two models, introducing a Dummy Variable for the region (significant for 
all levels), which equals 1 for firms in the U.S. and 0 for European ones, similar conclusions 
can be taken. It remarks the higher influence of European companies, and keeps the same 
significant variables as in the U.S. Model. The slope is negative (B6 = -1.027), which shows 
that a firm from the U.S. has lower propensity to pay dividends than one from Europe, 
everything else constant. In addition, all coefficients have the same signal as in the Model used 
for European firms. Therefore, the influence of investment opportunities became marginally 
positive (B4 = 0.004) while the others arrived to a midterm, maintaining the tendencies and 
impacts as the firms in Europe as can be seen in the coefficients of Size (B1 = 0.173), Cash 
Holdings (B2 = 0.442), Leverage Ratio (B3 = -5.290) and Profitability (B5 = 8.201). 
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5.1.3. Model 4 and 5: Propensity to repurchase shares  
Regarding the model of the propensity to repurchase shares, starting from the European 
companies, it is possible to ascertain a positive relation of all explanatory variables other than 
Leverage Ratio and Cash Holdings, which show a negative one. Hence, larger and more 
profitable firms with higher growth opportunities, holding less cash and Leverage Ratio have 
more tendency to buy back shares. Nevertheless, Cash Holdings is not significant for a 5% 
significance level and Leverage Ratio is significant only for 1% and 5% level. The other 
variables are statistically significant for any level of significance. Regarding the impact that the 
variables have on the propensity to repurchase shares, profitability shows, again, the highest 
value (B5 = 5.901), followed by Size (B1 = 0.136) and Growth Opportunities (B4 = 0.038), 
culminating in the quite negative slope of Leverage Ratio (B3 = -0.624).  
The average values for firms in the U.S. demonstrate the same relation with the propensity to 
repurchase shares as the ones in Europe. Yet, beyond Cash Holdings, Leverage Ratio also does 
not have any statistic relevance. The average coefficient leads to the realization the greater 
influence of Profitability (B5 = 9.376) compared to the firms in Europe. Then, the impact of 
growth (B4 = 0.025) is slightly lower than in Europe, while the size of the firms in the U.S. (B1 
= 0.169) affects more the propensity to engage in share buybacks. 
5.1.4. Model 6: Propensity to pay dividends with Region as a Dummy variable 
By developing a new model including the Dummy variable for the Region, meaning all 
observations from Europe and U.S. are included, one can take some interesting takeaways. First, 
for the likelihood to repurchase shares, the index the company belongs to reveals strong 
statistical relevance in favor of U.S. companies (B6 = 1.286). Then, as expected, Cash Holdings 
are still not statistical significant and the only change in significance is on the Leverage Ratio 
(B3 = -0.432) for a 1.0% significance level, as it is not significant, and for a 5% level, where it 
is significant. The other explanatory variables behave accordingly, with a B1 = 0.149 for size, 





Table 2 reports the summary results for the Log-Linear regressions estimated over the 2001-18 period. The 
dependent variable of model (1), (2), and (3) is the natural logarithm of Dividend payments amount. The dependent 
variable of model (4), (5), and (6) is the natural logarithm of Share Repurchases amount. Model (1) and (4) 
correspond to European firms, model (2) and (5) correspond to American Firms, and model (3) and (6) include all 
observations, using a Dummy Variable, Region, which takes the value of 1 for an American Firm, and 0 for a 
European one. The other explanatory variables used are Average Firm Size (measured by the natural logarithm of 
Total Assets), Cash Holdings (Cash and Short-Term Investments to Total Assets), Investment Opportunities 
(measured by Market to Book Ratio), Leverage Ratio (Total Debt over Total Assets), Profitability (ROA as proxy, 
which is Net Income/ Total Assets). The table shows the regression coefficients for every model analysed. In 
parenthesis is the standard error.  The asterisks characterize the significance of the values for different significance 
levels (*** α<0.001; ** α<0.01; * α<0.05) using the t test. 
5.2. Log-Liner Regressions on the value of dividends and buybacks 
After a deep analysis on the propensity to pay dividends, new models arise based on Log-Linear 
Regressions. The purpose is to analyse the aggregate amount of dividends paid and shares 
repurchased (the dependent variables are the natural logarithm of dividends and repurchases 
amount) displayed in table 2. By changing one unit of an explanatory variable, it is expected 
the dependent variable changes by 100*βi percent. 
5.2.1. Model 7 and 8: Amount of Dividends 
Firstly, for European firms a positive relationship is inferred for size, Investment Opportunities 
and Profitability, and a negative one for Cash holdings and Leverage ratio, with the aggregate 
amount paid of dividends. As such, a larger firm holding less cash and Leverage Ratio with 
higher investment opportunities and more profitable tends to pay more dividends. All 
explanatory variables are statistical relevant for the three significance levels used for the 
Table 2: Logistic regressions summary results 
Model
(7) -3,618 *** 0,954 *** -0,130 0,035 *** -0,824 *** 5,405 ***
(0,072) (0,007) (0,122) (0,002) (0,080) (0,167)
(8) -4,985 *** 1,032 *** 1,144 *** 0,023 *** 0,454 *** 5,195 ***
(0,122) (0,012) (0,129) (0,002) (0,107) (0,229)
(9) -4,009 *** 0,975 *** 0,604 *** 0,028 *** -0,222 *** 5,285 *** -0,221 ***
(0,064) (0,006) (0,089) (0,001) (0,066) (0,138) (0,017)
(10) -5,327 *** 0,940 *** 1,312 *** 0,046 *** -1,276 *** 8,760 ***
(0,260) (0,025) (0,398) (0,007) (0,269) (0,566)
(11) -3,722 *** 0,927 *** 0,863 *** 0,021 *** -0,625 *** 9,288 ***
(0,201) (0,020) (0,187) (0,003) (0,170) (0,379)
(12) -5,229 *** 0,928 *** 0,942 *** 0,027 *** -0,880 *** 9,191 *** 1,516 ***
(0,159) (0,016) (0,178) (0,003) (0,148) (0,320) (0,040)
Coefficient
Int Assetst Casht MBt Leveraget ROAt Region
31 
 
average aggregate amount of dividends, aside from Cash Holdings, which is not statistical 
significant for a 5% significance level. The variables keep the relation in the model for the 
propensity then, but the impacts are different. The largest one is still Profitability (B5 = 5.40), 
then Size (B1 = 0.95) and Investment Opportunities (B4 = 0.03) with the smallest positive 
effect. Negatively affecting the amount of dividends, there is the Leverage Ratio (B3= -0.82). 
On the other hand, the firms in the U.S., besides all variables being statistically significant for 
a 0.1% significance level, Cash Holdings and Leverage Ratio now affect the amount in a 
positive way, meaning all variables influence positively the amount paid in dividends. Hence, 
more profitable and larger U.S. firms holding more cash and with higher Leverage with more 
growth opportunities, on average, pay more dividends. More concretely, the impacts of size (B1 
= 1.03), Investment Opportunities (B4 = 0.02) and Profitability (B5 = 5.20) are similar to the 
ones affecting Europe, whereas the impacts of Holding Cash (B2 = 1.14) and Leverage Ratio 
(B3 = 0.02) go in the opposite way. 
5.2.2. Model 9: Amount of Dividends with Region as a Dummy variable 
The model involving both indexes, displays a statistic relevance for the Dummy Variable for 
all levels, meaning, a firm from the U.S. tends to pay less dividends then one from Europe, as 
the coefficient is negative (B6 = -0.22). Then, Both Size (B1 = 0.97), Investment Opportunities 
(B4 = 0.03) and Profitability (B5 = 5.28) remain stable as in the individual models, while the 
effect of Cash Holdings become positive (B2 = 0.6) and the one of Leverage Ratio gets negative 
(B3 = -0.22).  
5.2.3. Model 10 and 11: Amount of Repurchases 
Still on the value, starting with the European firms, but now on Repurchases, one can reckon a 
negative relation to holding Leverage and a positive one for all other variables. Highly 
profitable firms with bigger amounts of total assets holding high amounts of cash with good 
investment opportunities do greater buybacks, on average. Here, all variables show statistical 
significance for all levels of significance. Diving into the impact of each one, the expected is 
confirmed for all of them, starting by Size (B1 = 0.94), Cash Holdings (B2 = 1.31), Leverage 
Ratio (B3 = -1.28), Investment Opportunities (B4 = 0.05) and, lastly, Profitability (B5 = 8.76).  
As anticipated, firms in the U.S. have, on average, the same behavior as the ones in Europe, 
and all are statistically significant as well. It present lower coefficients for Size (B1 = 0.93), 
Cash Holdings (B2 = 0.86) and Investment Opportunities (B4 = 0.02) while higher ones for 
Leverage Ratio (B3 = -0.63) and Profitability (B5 = 9.26). 
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5.2.4. Model 12: Amount of Repurchases with Region as a Dummy variable 
Considering now the model including all firms and differentiating them with a respective 
dummy variable for each index, new inferences arise. Having the Region variable as significant 
for all levels of significance, it reports a positive relationship, which means a firm from the U.S. 
tends to repurchase higher amounts than one in Europe (B6 = 1.52). Next, all other variables 
appear to be statistical relevant as well, with impacts in the same line as the separate models, 
as the coefficients get to a midpoint as in Size (B1 = 0.93), in Cash Holdings (B2 = 0.94), in 
Leverage Ratio (B3 = -0.88), in Investment Opportunities (B4 = 0.03) and in Profitability (B5 
= 9.19).  





6. Conclusion, limitations and further research suggestions 
The current dissertation investigates the payout policy of European and American Firms. The 
focus is on confirming the recent trend of the reappearance of Dividends and boost of 
Repurchases, according to each group of firms in each region. As such, the findings go in line 
with the literature existent on the topic. In fact, there is a notable urge of repurchases, especially 
in Europe, although dividends keep as the main form of payout. In the U.S., the jump is enough 
to become the predominant form of payout. Contrasting with the late 2000s situation, dividends 
are also increasing, but at a significant lower rate than buybacks. By combining both forms of 
payout, this study shows a higher proportion of firms engaging in both forms of payout 
simultaneously in the U.S. (71%) than in Europe (55%). More interestingly, dividends proved 
its resilience in times of crisis, both in Europe and in the U.S. firms. 
Diving into the characteristics of the firms, larger and more profitable firms are more prone to 
pay dividends and repurchase shares, whereas firms with higher levels of cash spent on 
repurchases than on dividends. Moreover, European and American firms with more Investment 
Opportunities engage in both forms of payout, while lower amounts lead the firms to only 
paying dividends. While in the U.S., firms with the top ratios of Leverage do more dividend 
payments, in Europe these firms do not pay dividends, so they repurchase less than in America. 
A last striking conclusion is the statistically significant difference in behavior of European and 
American Firms regarding both the propensity and amounts of dividends and repurchases. On 
average, an American firm has less propensity to pay dividends and does it in lower amounts, 
while it has a higher propensity to repurchase and in a greater magnitude.  
Besides the important findings, the analysis might not be free of some biasness and lack of 
robustness. This paper restricts its analysis of Europe and U.S. to just one index for each. To 
prove for robustness, one could test for more indexes as well as collecting data manually and 
sorting for large market capitalization. In addition, the study could use different proxies for the 
same variables as well as including and testing for more variables (such as the age of the firm, 
the legal system of the country and the standard deviation of profitability). It could also expand 
the time span and divide the years into different sub periods, and use different panels for the 
regressions analysis, to support the current conclusions and get other conclusions. Then, one 
could explore in further detail the dividend substitution hypothesis and employ a multinomial 
logistic regression, which generalizes logistic regression allowing for more than two possible 
discrete outcomes for the dependent variable. Lastly, it would be interesting to analyse the 
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Table A1 displays the Compustat item number for each variable from S&P 500 Index firms and the Datastream 





Table A1: Compustat item number and Datastream symbol of each Variable 
Variable Compustat Item Datastream Symbol
Standard Industry Classification Code SIC Code WC07021
Cusip (Security) Code CUSIP WC06004
Total Assets #6 WC02999
Cash And Short Term Investmts #1 WC02001
Common Shares Outstanding #25 WC05301
Long Term Debt #9 WC03251
Short Term Debt #34 WC03051
Common  Dividends #21 WC18192
Income Before Extraordinary Items #18 WC01551
Dividends per Share #26 WC05101
Price Close #24 UP
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock #115 WC04751
Preferred Stock - Redemption Value #56
Net Income #177
Market Capitalization WC08001
Book Value Per Share WC05476
Return on Assets WC08326
Return on Equity WC08301
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Table A2: Explanation of variables used  
Table A2 displays the explanation behind each variable for the firm in the S&P 350 Europe Index firms and in the 
S&P 500 Index. 
Variable Explanation
Earnings Total Income Before Extraordinary Items.
Payout Ratio Only observations with positive earnings are considered. Dividend Payout Ratio is the 
ratio of Common Dividends to Earnings. Repurchase Payout Ratio is the ratio of 
Purchase of Common Shares to Earnings. Total Payout Ratio is the sum of Common 
Dividends and Purchase of Common Shares divided by Earnings.
Payout Mix Determines the composition of the total payout ratio. Dividend payout ratio is the ratio of 
Total Dividends to Total Payout. Repurchase payout ratio is the difference between Total 
Payout and Dividend Payout Ratio.
Size Total Assets as proxy. In the regression analysis, it is transformed to the logarithm of 
Total Assets (Ln (Total Assets)).
Market Capitalization Product of the number of common shares outstanding with the price per share.
Cash Holdings Ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Total Assets.
Investment 
Opportunities
Investment Opportunities indicates a firm’s under or overvaluation (Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) and Dechow et al. (1999)).  Adam and K. Goyal (2008) and FF find Market to 
Book Ratio to be the best proxy for Investment Opportunities, or Growth Opportunities. 
It is the Ratio of the Price per share Close to the Book Value per Share (which is the 
proxy used for Investment or Growth Opportunities).
Leverage Ratio Total Debt (Long Term Debt plus Short Term Debt) scaled to Total Assets.
Profitability ROA as proxy. Net Income over Total Assets.
Region Dummy variable that takes de value 1 if the company is from the U.S, and 0 if the 
company is from Europe.
Dividends Following Grullon and Michaely (2002) approach, it is the total dollar amount of 
dividends declared on the common stock of the firm during the year.
Repurchases The literature is not consensual on this variable. Skinner (2008) computes net repurchases 
as the difference between purchase of stock and stock issues while FF and Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) as the change in common Treasury stock (Compustat item #226) if 
Treasury stock is not zero or missing. If Treasury stock is less or equal to zero in the 
current and prior quarter, repurchases are the non-negative difference between stock 
purchases and sale of common stock (Compustat item #108) from the statement of cash 
flows. Otherwise, if either of these amounts is negative, repurchases are set to zero. 
However, since the objective is comparing dividends and repurchases, it is not ideal to 
subtract another financing activity of the firm from repurchases and not from dividends, as 
it would be comparing net repurchase activity to gross dividends. According to Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998), the exercise of stock options decreases the amount of Treasury 
stocks, therefore the true amount that was repurchased is underestimated. Using changes 
in shares outstanding in CRSP to measure it is also prone to measurement error, leading 
to actual repurchases underestimation if the number of shares simultaneously increases 
(e.g., through distribution of benefit plans or exercise of executive stock options). Using 
the Purchase of Common and Preferred Stocks to measure stock repurchases (with or 
without adjusting for preferred stock repurchases) is the most common and accepted 
measure. It is defended by Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan et al. (2000), 
Dittmar (2000), Kahle (2002), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a), Lie (2005c), Li and Lie (2006), and Kulchania (2012). On this analysis it will 
be subtracted any reductions in value from Redemption of Preferred to the Purchase of 
Common and Preferred Stock, which is the most accurate proxy in line with Banyi et al. 
(2008). However, as it is an aggregate of all security repurchases and retirements during 





















Table A3 Counts and fraction of European and A
merican firms by payout policy group for each year 
Table A3 presents the counts and fraction of firms in Europe and in the U.S. in each category over the 2001-18 period. The sample includes S&P 350 Europe and S&P 500 
firms. Utilities (SIC Code 4900-4949), Financial Services (SIC Code 6000-6999) and Non Classifiable (SIC Code 9900-9999) firms were excluded. Dividend Payers paid 
Counts of European firms 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
All firms 329 334 339 344 341 342 336 328 295 303 310 304 334 334 334 325 320 305
Dividend Payers 278 275 279 288 295 303 308 287 241 263 277 270 295 297 298 292 287 277
Non-Payers 51 59 60 56 46 39 28 41 54 40 33 34 39 37 36 33 33 28
Repurchase 91 80 91 127 159 192 211 220 121 148 181 162 180 186 178 176 176 177
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 80 72 80 115 152 180 198 201 104 129 170 153 167 175 171 165 165 168
Only Dividend Payers 198 203 199 173 143 123 110 86 137 134 107 117 128 122 127 127 122 109
Only Repurchase 11 8 11 12 7 12 13 19 17 19 11 9 13 11 7 11 11 9
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 40 51 49 44 39 27 15 22 37 21 22 25 26 26 29 22 22 19
Percents of European firms 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Dividend Payers 84,5 82,3 82,3 83,7 86,5 88,6 91,7 87,5 81,7 86,8 89,4 88,8 88,3 88,9 89,2 89,8 89,7 90,8
Non-Payers 15,5 17,7 17,7 16,3 13,5 11,4 8,3 12,5 18,3 13,2 10,6 11,2 11,7 11,1 10,8 10,2 10,3 9,2
Repurchase 27,7 24,0 26,8 36,9 46,6 56,1 62,8 67,1 41,0 48,8 58,4 53,3 53,9 55,7 53,3 54,2 55,0 58,0
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 24,3 21,6 23,6 33,4 44,6 52,6 58,9 61,3 35,3 42,6 54,8 50,3 50,0 52,4 51,2 50,8 51,6 55,1
Only Dividend Payers 60,2 60,8 58,7 50,3 41,9 36,0 32,7 26,2 46,4 44,2 34,5 38,5 38,3 36,5 38,0 39,1 38,1 35,7
Only Repurchase 3,3 2,4 3,2 3,5 2,1 3,5 3,9 5,8 5,8 6,3 3,5 3,0 3,9 3,3 2,1 3,4 3,4 3,0
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 12,2 15,3 14,5 12,8 11,4 7,9 4,5 6,7 12,5 6,9 7,1 8,2 7,8 7,8 8,7 6,8 6,9 6,2
Counts of American firms 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
All firms 253 255 255 257 260 267 276 285 294 299 307 315 317 320 328 335 339 303
Dividend Payers 185 181 186 192 197 198 208 214 211 220 233 246 252 258 264 267 270 238
Non-Payers 68 74 69 65 63 69 68 71 83 79 74 69 65 62 64 68 69 65
Repurchase 148 136 142 169 200 215 232 239 182 217 256 257 264 274 283 283 296 272
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 114 104 112 136 164 167 181 191 131 164 198 206 218 228 234 227 237 216
Only Dividend Payers 71 77 74 56 33 31 27 23 80 56 35 40 34 30 30 40 33 22
Only Repurchase 34 32 30 33 36 48 51 48 51 53 58 51 46 46 49 56 59 56
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 34 42 39 32 27 21 17 23 32 26 16 18 19 16 15 12 10 9
Percents of American firms 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Dividend Payers 73,1 71,0 72,9 74,7 75,8 74,2 75,4 75,1 71,8 73,6 75,9 78,1 79,5 80,6 80,5 79,7 79,6 78,5
Non-Payers 26,9 29,0 27,1 25,3 24,2 25,8 24,6 24,9 28,2 26,4 24,1 21,9 20,5 19,4 19,5 20,3 20,4 21,5
Repurchase 58,5 53,3 55,7 65,8 76,9 80,5 84,1 83,9 61,9 72,6 83,4 81,6 83,3 85,6 86,3 84,5 87,3 89,8
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 45,1 40,8 43,9 52,9 63,1 62,5 65,6 67,0 44,6 54,8 64,5 65,4 68,8 71,3 71,3 67,8 69,9 71,3
Only Dividend Payers 28,1 30,2 29,0 21,8 12,7 11,6 9,8 8,1 27,2 18,7 11,4 12,7 10,7 9,4 9,1 11,9 9,7 7,3
Only Repurchase 13,4 12,5 11,8 12,8 13,8 18,0 18,5 16,8 17,3 17,7 18,9 16,2 14,5 14,4 14,9 16,7 17,4 18,5
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 13,4 16,5 15,3 12,5 10,4 7,9 6,2 8,1 10,9 8,7 5,2 5,7 6,0 5,0 4,6 3,6 2,9 3,0
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dividends in year t; Non-Payers did not. Repurchase are firms that repurchased shares in year t. Dividend Payers & Repurchase engaged in both forms in year t. Dividend Payers 
Only and Repurchase Only firms just paid dividends and repurchased, respectively, in year t. Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase did not distribute cash to shareholders in year t.  
Table A4: Aggregate cash distributions to shareholders 
Table A4 reports annual information on aggregate cash distributions to shareholders and respective payout ratios for a sample of European and American firms. The data consist 
of all firm-year observations on Compustat and Datastream over the 2001-18 period, which contain information on the following variables: Repurchases, Dividends and 
Earnings. Repurchase is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks minus any reduction in the value (redemption value) of the net number of preferred 
shares outstanding. Dividend is the
EU Aggregate Payout Ratios 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Earnings 231  217  256  380  457  525  589  504  369  555  574  546  512  556  461  461  673  672  
Total Payout 110  112  137  199  265  305  389  292  235  314  367  335  345  387  370  324  390  466  
Dividends 81    85    116  144  181  216  242  197  201  258  272  278  284  312  295  275  324  354  
Repurchases 28    27    21    55    84    89    148  95    34    56    95    57    61    75    75    49    66    112  
US Absolute Payout Ratios 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Earnings 189 223 263 337 401 438 464 448 404 535 604 584 647 653 605 612 710 706
Total Payout 148 156 173 243 333 423 537 390 249 382 493 488 586 619 660 627 625 711
Dividends 71 76 88 99 118 131 154 148 146 164 184 207 239 255 277 277 306 289
Repurchases 77 80 86 144 214 293 382 242 103 218 309 281 347 364 383 350 319 421
EU Payout Ratios 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total Payout 47,6 51,6 53,7 52,4 58,0 58,1 66,1 57,9 63,7 56,6 63,8 61,4 67,4 69,6 80,2 70,3 57,9 69,3
Dividends 35,3 39,0 45,3 38,0 39,6 41,2 41,0 39,1 54,6 46,5 47,4 50,9 55,5 56,1 63,9 59,7 48,1 52,7
Repurchases 12,3 12,6 8,4 14,5 18,4 16,9 25,0 18,8 9,2 10,1 16,5 10,5 11,8 13,6 16,3 10,7 9,8 16,6
US Payout Ratios 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total Payout 78,4 70,0 65,7 72,2 83,1 96,6 115,7 87,2 61,7 71,4 81,6 83,5 90,6 94,8 109,1 102,4 88,0 100,7
Dividends 37,6 33,9 33,2 29,5 29,6 29,8 33,3 33,1 36,2 30,7 30,5 35,5 36,9 39,0 45,8 45,2 43,1 41,0




total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock. Earnings is the earnings before extraordinary 
items. 
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2001-03 2004-06 2007-10 2011-14 2015-18 2001-18
Assetst (millions)
All Firms 20 032  21 448  28 028  32 242  38 808  28 792  
Dividend Payers 20 864  23 685  30 060  34 482  41 222  30 964  
Non-Payers 15 957  7 392    14 329  14 407  17 387  13 937  
Repurchase 27 770  23 438  26 094  29 978  35 235  28 836  
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 27 963  24 474  27 202  31 107  36 512  30 144  
Only Dividend Payers 18 119  22 882  33 927  39 217  47 718  31 843  
Only Repurchase 26 279  8 503    15 794  12 920  12 753  15 067  
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 14 245  7 276    12 805  14 922  19 300  13 552  
Casht (percent)
All Firms 11,6 12,7 11,5 11,6 11,2 11,7
Dividend Payers 10,7 11,7 10,8 11,2 11,0 11,1
Non-Payers 16,2 19,0 16,4 14,1 13,2 15,9
Repurchase 12,5 12,8 11,3 11,9 11,8 12,0
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 12,3 12,1 10,5 11,9 11,5 11,5
Only Dividend Payers 10,1 11,2 11,1 10,3 10,2 10,6
Only Repurchase 14,0 22,1 18,6 12,5 15,6 16,7
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 16,7 18,1 14,8 14,8 12,2 15,5
MBt (percent)
All Firms 3,5 3,3 3,1 3,2 2,9 3,2
Dividend Payers 3,1 2,8 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,8
Non-Payers 5,7 6,1 5,7 6,1 3,8 5,5
Repurchase 4,3 3,2 3,0 2,9 2,9 3,2
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 12,3 12,1 10,5 11,9 11,5 11,5
Only Dividend Payers 2,6 2,7 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,7
Only Repurchase 5,4 6,0 5,5 2,8 4,5 4,8
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 5,8 6,1 5,2 6,4 2,7 5,3
Leveaget (percent)
All Firms 28,5 25,5 26,6 24,7 24,9 25,9
Dividend Payers 27,9 25,2 26,2 24,0 24,4 25,4
Non-Payers 31,6 27,5 29,0 29,9 30,0 29,7
Repurchase 28,2 24,0 26,1 24,0 24,6 25,3
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 27,3 24,6 26,3 23,8 24,3 25,0
Only Dividend Payers 28,1 25,8 26,1 24,4 24,4 25,9
Only Repurchase 35,1 15,7 24,7 28,2 29,6 26,5
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 30,8 30,9 32,1 30,7 30,2 30,9
ROAt (percent)
All Firms 4,0 8,2 7,7 7,0 6,4 6,7
Dividend Payers 5,8 8,9 8,5 7,7 7,2 7,6
Non-Payers -4,7 3,9 2,7 1,5 -0,9 0,4
Repurchase 6,7 9,7 8,8 8,3 8,2 8,4
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 7,6 9,8 9,2 8,7 8,4 8,8
Only Dividend Payers 5,1 8,1 7,5 6,3 5,5 6,4
Only Repurchase -0,8 8,7 5,1 2,6 3,4 4,0
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2001-03 2004-06 2007-10 2011-14 2015-18 2001-18
Assetst (millions)
All Firms 19 034  22 699  23 731  28 578  33 337  26 436  
Dividend Payers 22 377  26 550  26 867  32 170  36 209  29 923  
Non-Payers 10 289  11 225  14 842  15 419  22 118  15 178  
Repurchase 20 971  24 091  23 194  28 487  32 511  26 730  
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 23 523  27 192  26 477  32 515  36 309  30 652  
Only Dividend Payers 20 673  24 051  28 266  30 060  35 477  26 952  
Only Repurchase 12 196  11 711  12 407  11 454  16 733  13 194  
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 8 697    8 856    19 887  26 970  47 876  18 924  
Casht (percent)
All Firms 10,8 13,2 13,5 14,5 13,1 13,2
Dividend Payers 7,4 10,6 10,6 12,5 11,7 10,9
Non-Payers 19,7 21,0 21,6 21,9 18,8 20,7
Repurchase 11,7 12,7 13,4 15,1 13,3 13,4
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 8,1 10,9 10,8 13,2 12,0 11,5
Only Dividend Payers 6,3 9,3 9,8 7,8 9,4 8,4
Only Repurchase 23,8 19,9 21,8 22,8 18,6 21,2
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 16,3 22,6 21,2 19,3 19,9 19,6
MBt (percent)
All Firms 3,9 3,9 3,8 3,7 3,9 3,8
Dividend Payers 3,1 3,1 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0
Non-Payers 6,1 6,5 6,6 6,4 7,5 6,6
Repurchase 4,2 3,9 3,7 3,6 3,8 3,8
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 8,1 10,9 10,8 13,2 12,0 11,5
Only Dividend Payers 2,5 3,0 3,0 2,5 2,2 2,6
Only Repurchase 6,6 6,9 6,4 5,8 6,2 6,3
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 5,7 5,8 6,6 8,1 13,5 7,2
Leveaget (percent)
All Firms 25,3 21,3 23,3 25,3 31,2 25,7
Dividend Payers 27,0 22,4 24,2 26,1 32,1 26,8
Non-Payers 20,9 17,9 20,6 22,2 27,9 22,1
Repurchase 23,9 20,6 22,6 25,1 31,0 25,3
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 25,7 22,2 23,8 25,9 31,8 26,6
Only Dividend Payers 28,8 23,3 25,7 27,3 34,6 27,9
Only Repurchase 17,6 14,4 18,7 21,5 27,8 21,1
Non-Payers & Non-Repurchase 23,6 23,0 24,6 24,4 28,1 24,4
ROAt (percent)
All Firms 4,3 7,6 6,7 7,8 7,0 6,8
Dividend Payers 5,6 8,2 7,0 7,7 6,9 7,1
Non-Payers 1,2 5,8 5,9 8,2 7,5 5,9
Repurchase 6,5 8,8 7,8 8,5 7,8 8,0
Dividend Payers & Repurchase 7,0 8,8 7,8 8,2 7,7 8,0
Only Dividend Payers 3,4 5,8 3,9 4,7 0,5 3,7
Only Repurchase 5,0 8,9 7,9 9,9 8,2 8,2





Table A5 reports firm characteristics by payout policy group over 2001-18, with the following sub periods: 2001-
03, 2004-06, 2007-10, 2011-14, 2015-18. Figure 3a contains the information on European firms. Figure 3b 
contains information on American firms. The observations contain information on the following variables: 
Average firm Size (measured by Total Assets), Cash Holdings (Cash and Short-Term Investments to Total Assets), 
Investment Opportunities (measured by Market to Book Ratio), Leverage Ratio (Total Debt over Total Assets), 
Profitability (ROA as proxy). The values shown are aggregate values for the firms in each payout group, averaged 
over the years in a period.  
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